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ABSTRACT 
 
A profound structural change is municipal merger. This come about through absorption of small 
units or merge of units to create a new entity.  Both are intended to improve efficiency by taking 
advantage of economies of scale and scope. However, consolidation may temporarily and negative-
ly affect other dimensions of performance. Nevertheless, experienced chief executives should miti-
gate the transitional challenges. This study tests the moderating effect of chief executive’s public 
experience on the consolidation-performance relationship. This proposition is tested using data for 
all the 807 city-level Japanese municipalities for the 2006-2010 period. Two dimensions of perfor-
mance are studied: efficiency in operational costs, and effectiveness in revenue collection. Findings 
reveal that merger through municipal absorption increases efficiency in operational costs but reduc-
es revenue expansion. Merger through creation of a new municipality reduces municipal own reve-
nue collection. Chief executive’s past experience neither mitigate nor accelerate the effects of mu-
nicipal consolidation on performance.  
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Introduction 
 
Worldwide, scholars and practitioners have searched for the factors and practices that improve 
governmental performance. This search has intensified since the early 1980s with the advent of 
New Public Management (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992), which generate greater concern for gov-
ernment performance and led to the adoption of market practices (Hood, 1991, Walker et al., 
2011). As a result, private sector practices and strategies have been promoted and implemented in 
public organizations with the goal of boosting performance. One of these strategies involves 
changes in the organizational structure such as consolidating two or more organizations into a sin-
gle one in order to capitalize on the potential benefits of both economies of scale and combined 
human resource and thus to boost performance (Hirsch, 1967, Lomax, 1952, Whetten, 1978). 
 
A profound change in public organizational structure is municipal merger.1This may come about 
through public organizations absorbing other small units or merging with additional units to create 
new entities.  Both types of consolidation are intended to improve efficiency by taking advantage of 
economies of scale and scope (Lomax, 1952, Whetten, 1978, Christenson and Sachs, 1980). Munic-
ipal merger is uncommon in the U.S. (Feiock and Carr, 2000, Leland and Thurmaier, 2005, Savitch 
and Vogel, 2004). However, it has been a major reform in other developed countries. In the last 15 
years, municipal consolidations have been planned or implemented in half of OECD member 
countries (OECD, 2014). 
 
While consolidation may improve efficiency, this restructuring may not always beneficial for per-
formance due to the emergence of coordination problems, bureaucratic distance, and administrative 
overload (Tullock, 1965), as well as delays in both service delivery and response to changes in envi-
ronment and citizens’ demands (Andrews and Boyne, 2012). Moreover, there exists the possibility 
that consolidation benefits organizational efficiency but hinders other dimensions of performance 
such as equity, effectiveness, output quality, responsiveness, etc.  
 
On the other hand, public management research has consistently argued for the performance ef-
fects of chief executives’ background experience. The notion is that experience endows managers 
with autonomy, decisiveness, networking skills, intuitive and technical knowledge, and how-to wis-
dom for decision-making (Doig, 1990, Hambrick and Mason, 1984, Lynn, 1981, Lynn, 1996, Sa-
lanick and Pfeffer, 1977, Wilson and Doig, 2000, Wernerfelt, 1984). In the public sector, studies 
                                                     
1
 In this paper, the words “municipal consolidation”, “merger”, and “amalgamation” are used interchangeably.  
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have reported considerable evidence for the direct effects of top managers’ credentials on organiza-
tional performance (Avellaneda, 2009, Avellaneda, 2012, Boyne and Dahya, 2002, Boyne and Meier, 
2009, Boyne et al., 2011, Carmeli, 2004, O'Toole and Meier, 2003, Ricucci, 1995, Petrovsky et al., 
2015). By contrast, scarce attention has been given to how chief executives’ background experience 
may moderate the impact that structural changes may have on organizational performance.  Specifi-
cally, we contend that when organizations undergo a consolidation, the expected performance im-
pacts of a structural reform are moderated by the chief executive’s background experience. Experi-
enced chief executives are expected to mitigate the negative impacts of structural reforms by taking 
advantage of their acquired craft and knowledge when dealing with new and unforeseen challenges.  
 
We test the direct effect of consolidation as well as the moderating effect of chief executive’s back-
ground experience on the consolidation -performance relationship at the municipal level. Specifical-
ly, we focus on Japanese municipal mergers and mayoral experience and expertise. Japanese munic-
ipalities are appropriate settings because many of these mayor-led local governments have under-
gone a change in their structural context by (1) absorbing other localities and/or (2) merging with 
other localities to create new municipalities. Indeed, the number of all levels of Japanese municipali-
ties (including cities, towns and villages) decreased from 3,229 in 1999 to 1,727 in 2010. We use a 
data set covering all the 807 city-level Japanese municipalities during the 2006-2010 period to test 
the moderating effects of chief executive’s background experience on the consolidation-
performance relationship.  
 
Three indicators of municipal performance are studied: (1) efficiency in operational costs, (2) effec-
tiveness in revenue collection through non-tax sources, and (3) effectiveness in property tax collec-
tion. After controlling for political and economic factors, we find that municipal merger through 
absorption of localities increases efficiency in operational costs but reduces revenue expansion 
through non-tax sources. Municipal merger through a creation of new municipality reduces both 
municipal own revenue collection through both non-tax sources and property tax collection. Fur-
thermore, chief executive’s previous experience neither mitigate nor accelerate the effects of munic-
ipal consolidation on performance. These results have practical implications for public management 
by suggesting that the impact of structural reform on performance varies depending on both the 
dimension of performance that is being assessed as well as the nature of structural reform (absorp-
tion or creation of a new municipality).  
 
This research contributes to the public management literature in three ways. First, the study adds to 
the understanding the influence of both chief executives and structural reform in local govern-
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ments. Second, by testing the propositions across two dimensions of performance (efficiency and 
effectiveness), this research explores whether the effects of both managerial attributes and structur-
al change vary across performance dimensions. Third, in addition to testing linear relations, this 
study assesses the indirect or moderating effects of managerial quality on the structural reform-
performance relationship. 
 
This study is organized into five sections. The first section introduces the concepts of consolidation 
and executive/managerial attributes, provides the rationale for testing these characteristics and 
derives the testable hypotheses. The second section provides background information on Japanese 
municipalities and their experience with municipal merge/consolidation. The third section de-
scribes the research design and variable operationalization, followed by a fourth section containing 
results and analysis. The fifth section presents conclusions, limitations, and suggestions for future 
research. 
 
The Impact of Consolidation on Performance 
 
Municipal merge/consolidation/amalgamation is an administrative and structural reform, whose 
implementation can be either mandatory or voluntary.  Consolidation means “[t]he action or pro-
cess of combining a number of things into a single more effective or coherent whole”(Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2016). Consequently, municipal consolidation reduces the number of units by com-
bining two or more municipalities. The resulting consolidated units will increase their scale in terms 
of area and population. Municipal amalgamation has been common in developed countries such as 
Australia, Denmark, Finland, the United States, and Japan(OECD, 2014).  On the contrary, transi-
tional economies have opted for fragmentation(Avellaneda and Gomes, 2015).  
 
The promoters of consolidation contend that aggregating small units improves service coordination 
and produces economies of scale and scope(Christenson and Sachs, 1980, Hirsch, 1968, Lomax, 
1952, Shepherd, 1990, Whetten, 1978).These arguments assert that larger organizations (1) have 
greater control over the external environment (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978); (2) spread administrative 
costs across a larger set of services(Stigler, 1958); (3) avoid administrative duplication (Andrews and 
Boyne 2009; Lomax 1952); and (4) lower input prices through their greater purchasing power (An-
drews and Boyne 2009).  Therefore, municipal consolidation should lead to efficiency in adminis-
trative/operational costs.  
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Empirical evidence about the benefits of consolidation is however inconclusive (Allers and 
Geertsema, 2014, Vojnovic, 2000, Reingewertz, 2012). Holzer et al.’s review of 65 studies related to 
municipal size and performance states that “there is little correlation between size and efficiency for 
municipalities with populations between 25,000 and 250,000,” and “larger municipalities with popu-
lations over 250,000 are clearly less efficient” (2009, 1). Likewise, Boyne’s review (2003) of 23 stud-
ies testing the size–performance relationship in public organizations finds that the results are nei-
ther robust nor conclusive. Given that most of the existing empirical work has been done in the 
United States and European countries, this study presents an additional tests of the administrative 
efficiency of municipal consolidation in the Japanese context. Therefore,  
 
H1a: Municipal consolidation is expected to be positively correlated to performance in terms of efficiency in operation-
al costs 
 
On the other hand, in the 1980s, New Public Management scholars, along with public choice theo-
rists, argue against consolidation, for it hinders government responsiveness by (1) reducing gov-
ernment–citizen proximity(Pollitt et al., 1998); (2) discoursing heterogeneity in service provision 
(Grosskopf and Yaisawarng, 1990), (3) increasing bureaucratic absenteeism (Bhatti et al., 2015), 
coordination problems, administrative delays and duplication (Tullock 1965), and (5) failing to re-
spond to changed environments (Andrews and Boyne 2012).  As mentioned above, empirical evi-
dence supports neither side of the story.  
 
However, municipal consolidation should positively contribute to expansion of revenue collection 
for several reasons. For one, consolidation automatically increases both the number of tax payers 
and the size of the area being taxed. For two, merged units should capitalize on both administrative 
expertise and experience of their pooled human capital as well as on the combined equipment, 
facilities, and technological assets. Consequently,   
 
H1b: Municipal consolidation is expected to be positively correlated to performance in terms of revenue expansion 
 
Chief Executives’ Background  
 
The background of chief executives in public settings vary greatly, resulting in significant implica-
tions for organizational performance (Avellaneda, 2012, Becker and Gerhart, 1996, Fernandez, 
2005, Moore, 1995, Meier and O'Toole, 2002, O'toole and Meier, 1999). According to Bhagat, Bol-
ton, and Subramanian (2010, 1), “CEO ability is the composition of observable and quantifiable 
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characteristics such as education and work experience as well as unobservable and potentially non-
quantifiable characteristics such as leadership and team-building skills.” Moreover, according to 
Hambrick and Mason’s “upper echelons theory” (1984, 193), organizational outcomes reflect the 
values and cognitive frames of powerful actors in the organization, and managers’ attributes, such 
as education and sectorial background, serve as proxies for their cognitive frames (see also (Finkel-
stein and Hambrick (1996), Hambrick (2007)).2 This research focuses on two observable chief ex-
ecutive attributes –experience and expertise – and considers their moderating effect on the gov-
ernment performance-consolidation relationship. 
 
Public sector experience: Some scholars argue that education is not an appropriate proxy for 
CEO ability (Bhagat et al., 2010), while others claim that managers’ experience acquired from un-
codified, intuitive, and artistic knowledge also influences performance (Lynn, 1996). The Resource-
Based View highlights the key role that an organization’s resources have on performance (Werner-
felt, 1984).  Chief executives’ experience contributes to the sustainable competitive advantage of the 
organization given its uniqueness and distinctiveness (Barney, 1991, Wernerfelt, 1984). Experience 
likely affects a leader’s performance by (a) providing job-related knowledge; (b) empowering leaders 
to cope with demanding conditions; (c) granting self-confidence and control of situations (Fiedler 
1987, 32); (d) increasing ability to deal with task difficult (Littlepage et al. 1997, 134), (e) familiariz-
ing leaders with procedures, strategies and key actors; and (f) facilitating decision-making processes.  
Empirical evidence of the experience-performance relationship in the public sector is inconclusive.  
Fernandez (2005)’s systematic study of the influence of superintendents’ total years of experience 
on school performance in the USA, for instance, yields no statistical evidence for the expected 
positive relationship. On the other hand, Avellaneda and Gomes’ (2015) study of Brazilian munici-
palities reports that mayors’ age, a proxy for experience, is positively correlated with property tax 
collection.  The inconclusiveness of results calls for more research on the influence of a chief exec-
utive’s experience on performance, this time in an understudied developed setting such as Japanese 
municipalities. Thus, 
 
H2a: Organizations whose chief executives have public sector experience will have higher performance (e.g., in admin-
istrative efficiency and effectiveness in increasing revenue collection) than those whose chief executives do not. 
 
                                                     
2
 Demographic indicators of executives and top management teams have been employed to explain organizational 
performance in the private (Boker 1997, Matsunaga and Yeung 2008; Bamber et al. 2008; D’Aveni 1990) and public 
sectors (Carmeli 2004, 2006; Avellaneda 2009a,b,  2012; Sebaa et al. 2009; Damanpour and Schneider’s 2009; Meier 
and  O’Toole 2002). 
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Expertise: According to Ericsson et al. (1993), expertise refers to the “domain-specific skills and 
knowledge that are important to attainment of expert performance” (365), and “is acquired slowly 
over a very long time as a result of practice” (366). That is, with extensive practice a chief executive 
can become very good at a particular thing or job, whether technical, non-technical, or both. “Ex-
perts are faster and more accurate… and their memory for representative stimuli from their domain 
is vastly superior to that of lesser experts, especially for briefly presented stimuli” (Ericsson et al. 
1993, 365). Experience on a particular task leads chief executives to accumulate (1) wisdom, (2) in-
depth knowledge, (3) the ability to respond to situations, and (4) group experience, which together 
constitute expertise (Avellaneda 2016, see also Littlepage et al. 1997).  Empirical evidence has 
shown that experts’ superior performance is acquired through long experience, and that the effect 
of practice on performance is large (Ericsson et al. 1993: 365–368, see also Glaser et al. (1988) ). 
Moreover, expertise also contributes to the organization’s competitive advantage since “[a] mem-
ber’s expertise is an important resource that can greatly impact on group performance” (Littlepage 
et al. 1997: 133; see also Laughlin (1980). Therefore,  
 
H2b: The longer a chief executive has been performing the same task, the higher the organizational performance (e.g., 
in administrative efficiency and effectiveness in increasing revenue collection) 
 
The Moderating Role of Chief Executive’s Experience on the Consol-
idation-Performance Relationship 
 
As mentioned before, empirical studies testing the effect of municipal consolidation on perfor-
mance have led to inconsistent results. This inconsistency may be due to the fact that existing stud-
ies have focused on the direct rather than the indirect effects of consolidation. The consolidation of 
units entails new organizational demands, structure, culture, and context as well as a more diverse 
group of customers. Managing a larger population, satisfying the needs of a more demographically 
and socio-economic heterogeneous target, and dealing with a more diverse economy and set of 
interest groups are some of the new job demands arising from consolidation. Similarly, supervising 
a larger and more diverse bureaucracy; restructuring organizational units; coordinating with differ-
ent bureaucrats, who used to work in different cultural environments; bargaining with more mem-
bers and more ideologies in the city council; and managing a larger budget are some of the new 
organizational demands resulting from consolidation.  
 
Within this new structural context, the expected positive contributions of consolidation on perfor-
mance may not be seen in the first place. Indeed, instead of positive effects, consolidation may 
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result in negative performance, for bureaucrats may not be fitted to undertake the new task, which 
calls for a transition period of learning and adjustment.  Kristof (1996) defines person-job fit as 
“the fit between the abilities of a person and the demands of a job (i.e., demands-abilities),” where 
job refers to the tasks and characteristics of the tasks a person is expected to accomplish (Kristof 
1996, 8). However, the potential negative impact of consolidation on municipal performance 
should be mitigated by a chief executives’ public sector experience and expertise,  
 
The moderating impact of a chief executive’s background experience on the consolidation-
performance relationship may work through several mechanisms. For instance, chief executives 
may dedicate time to outreaching activities to meet new actors, interest groups, and constituents. In 
addition, experienced chief executive should capitalize on their accumulated knowledge to be more 
proactive and innovative in dealing with new challenges posed by consolidation. Finally, experi-
enced managers are expected to have more connections in other entities and levels of governments, 
which should facilitate both decision-making and implementation of policies and programs. In sum, 
chief executives of municipalities that have experienced a merge operate in a different context than 
those whose municipalities that have not undergone a merge or consolidation. Although some 
studies have tested the effect of managerial quality (e.g., experience and expertise) on performance 
(Andrews and Boyne, 2009), to our knowledge, empirical studies testing the conditioning effect of 
managerial quality on the consolidation-performance relationship are scarce. Our study fills the gap 
in the literature and seeks to contribute to our understanding of the conditioning effect of manage-
rial quality and expertise on the consolidation-performance relationship. Therefore,  
 
H3: The chief executive’s experience and expertise condition the municipal consolidation–performance relationship. 
Case Selection: Japanese Local Governments 
 
In this study, we focus on the local governments of Japan to test our hypotheses. The unit of analy-
sis is municipality-year.  We select Japan for the following reasons. First, Japanese considerable 
experience with municipal consolidation provides us with an excellent opportunity to test its effect 
on government performance. Second, data on the variables of our interest are available for all city-
level municipalities, allowing us to conduct a nationwide analysis. Third, despite their long experi-
ence with democracy, Japanese local governments have been understudied. Finally, by focusing on 
within-country variation, institutional, historical, and macroeconomic factors are held constant, 
facilitating identification of local drivers of performance.  
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Japanese subnational governments consist of two units, prefecture (regional units) and municipality 
(local units). Municipalities, in turn, are categorized into cities, towns, and villages. As of April 2014, 
Japan has 47 prefectures and 1,718 municipalities, and of these 790 are cities, 745 are towns, and 
183 are villages (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, 2014). Japanese local govern-
ment structure consists of the legislative branch and the executive branch. Members of local as-
semblies, governors, and mayors are directly elected by the people. Local assemblies have voting 
rights in matters including budget and ordinances, and can conduct a no-confidence vote in 
mayors. Mayors and local assembly members are directly elected by residents for four-year terms. 
Mayors cannot concurrently hold posts in the National Diet and local assembly. Mayors’ rights 
include enacting regulations, preparing budgets, proposing bills, and appointing or dismissing mu-
nicipal staff.  
 
Japanese Municipal Structural Context: Municipal merger 
 
Declining birthrate and tough financial conditions are among the drivers that led the Japanese cen-
tral government to promote consolidation (Yokomichi, 2007). Municipal merges were conducted 
on a voluntary basis. However, the central government set 1,000 as the target number of municipal-
ities and asked prefecture/regional governments to promote consolidation within their jurisdictions 
(Yokomichi, 2007) by providing strong financial and economic incentives. All Japanese territory is 
divided into municipalities, and there are no unincorporated jurisdictions or areas directly governed 
by a prefectural (or regional) government. Japanese municipal consolidation takes place horizontally 
only among cities, towns, and/or villages (all of which are municipalities). This is in contrast to the 
United States, in which consolidations may involve units from different levels of governments such 
as city-county consolidations (Feiock and Carr, 1997). 
 
During the period of the Great Heisei Municipal Consolidation, the number of Japanese municipal-
ities decreased from 3,229 in 1999 to 1,821 in 2006 (Yokomichi, 2007), and this number continues 
decreasing. Two types of consolidation have been adopted: (1) municipal absorption, in which a 
core municipality absorbs other partners, and (2) creation of a new municipality by merging units 
(Miyazaki, 2014). Through absorption, the core municipality retains both its mayor and legal status, 
while the absorbed municipalities forego theirs. In many cases, names of core municipalities are 
maintained, and city offices of core municipalities continue to serve as the headquarters for the 
consolidated unit. Newly created municipalities, by contrast, are granted a new legal status, and the 
comprising units have to decide on both a new name and office location for the created municipali-
ty (Ehime Prefecture, n.d.). The same principles generally apply for the composition of the munici-
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pal council, with members of the core municipality retained in the case of annexation and with a 
new council formed for a new municipality. From April 1999 to April 2014, there were 649 cases of 
municipal consolidation:3 461 cases of creation of a new municipality, and 188 cases of municipal 
annexation.4  Both consolidation types bring changes to local government structure, and these 
changes are expected to condition the managerial background effects on municipal performance.  
 
Data Collection and Variable Operationalization 
 
In this study the unit of analysis is the municipality-year. We target all city-level municipalities from 
2006 to 2010, covering 807 cities. However, by May 2015 this number has decreased to 790 due to 
further consolidations taken place after 2010. As the mayoral term is four years, the panel contains 
data from two mayoral administrations. Towns and villages were excluded because of data unavail-
ability on mayors’ demographics and backgrounds. The two main datasets we used are 1) Japanese 
Research Institute for Local Government (2004-2010) and 2) Research Institute on Local Admin-
istration and Finance (2004-2010). These datasets provide information about mayors’ demographic 
(e.g., name, age, education, job history) and political data (e.g., party affiliation, reelection times, 
vote share, political party’s vote share). We collect data on municipal consolidation from Ministry 
of Internal Affairs and Communications (n.d.3). Local socioeconomic and financial data come from 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (2015) and Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications (n.d.4). Our dataset covers five fiscal years from 2006 to 2010. All city-level mu-
nicipalities that exist at the end of each fiscal year (2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010) are included 
in the dataset, numbering 807. Among city-level municipalities, 477 municipal consolidations took 
place from 1999 to 2010: 422 cases before 2005 and 55 cases after 2005 and before 2010. Since 
most of the municipal consolidations took place before 2005, our dataset, which covers 2006-2010, 
enables us to test how municipal consolidation conditions the mayoral ability- performance rela-
tionship few years after the merge took place. We acknowledge that comparing pre-merger and 
post-merger data in the post-merger unit is ideal. However, mayor’s demographic and background 
data is not available for pre-merger municipalities in the post-merger unit. The pre-merger munici-
pality consisted of at least two municipalities, having two mayors. We think that the averaged 
mayoral data at the post-merger unit is not an appropriate measurement.  
 
 
                                                     
3
 Among them, 582 consolidations were conducted during the period of the Great Heisei Consolidations from April 1999 
to March 2006. 
4
 This number includes duplicated consolidations, in which municipalities conducted municipal consolidations more than 
twice.  
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Measuring Municipal Performance  
 
In this study, we focus on the following three measurements: efficiency in operational costs, and 
effectiveness in revenue expansion through (1) non-tax sources and (2) property tax collection. 
Revenue collection is considered an input, which is expected to lead to more both outputs and 
outcome. Municipal mergers were carried out mainly between the 2000-2006 period, therefore as-
sessing outcomes with our data set covering the 2006-2010 period is premature. The first indicator 
of performance seeks to test the argument of administrative efficiency that comes from consolida-
tion. This measure refers to the percentage of total municipal budget that is spent on administrative 
costs (e.g. salary, supplies, equipment, and other mandatory expenses). The data come from Minis-
try of Internal Affairs and Communications (2015).  
 
This study also assesses performance in terms of effectiveness in revenue collection, allowing us to 
tests the effect of consolidation across two different dimensions of performance. Due to increasing 
debt and declining population and economic conditions, many Japanese local governments began 
to consider revenue expansion as a primary goal (Research Institute for Local Government, 2010). 
Major tools for revenue expansion include (1) enhancing tax revenue collection, (2) sales, (3) leases 
and management of municipal properties, and (4) increasing fees and charges. An amendment to 
the Local Autonomy Act in 2006 granted power to localities to obtain revenues by utilizing their 
own assets such as landed property and movable property (e.g. leasing, sales).  
 
Effectiveness in revenue expansion is operationalized with two distinct indicators: municipal reve-
nue collection through (1) property tax collection and (2) non-tax sources such as rents, fees, dona-
tions, sale of assets, and charges and allotments.  Property collection rate is calculated as the per-
centage of property tax actually collected out of the amount expected to be collected.  Collection of 
revenues through non-tax sources is reported in thousand Japanese yens per capita, and these val-
ues were obtained from Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (n.d.4; 2015). Table 1 
provides the descriptive statistics for all the variables. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Independent Variables: Our key independent variables are 1) municipal consolidation and chief 
executives’ experience and expertise. Municipal consolidation is a categorical variable, consisting of 
three groups. The first category is the baseline, denoting the municipalities that experience no mer-
ger in the 1999-2010 period. The second category describes whether a municipality has experienced 
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any consolidation through absorption. That is, if a locality absorbed at least one municipality during 
1999-2010, it falls within this category. Finally, the third category represents municipalities that 
were created as a new municipality through consolidation of two or more units at any point during 
1999-20105. 
 
A chief executive’s experience is assessed with mayoral experience at the state (or prefecture) and 
national level.6  It is a dummy variable giving a value of “1” to those mayors who had working ex-
perience in prefectural and/or national government such as being a prefecture assembly member, 
National Diet member, and/or state and/or national government employee.  A chief executive’s 
expertise is captured with mayors’ reelection occurrences, for long-term experience with the same 
task enables mayors to accumulate expertise. In Japan, mayors may be reelected for an indefinite 
number of terms7. We use a dummy variable, which gives a value of “1” to those mayors who have 
been reelected consecutively, at least one period; otherwise, it takes the value of “0”.  In order to 
test the conditioning effects of mayoral experience and expertise on the consolidation-performance 
relationship, we create interaction terms between each of the consolidation types (absorption and 
creation of new municipality) and each of the mayoral qualities: experience and expertise. 
 
Control variables: This study controls for other factors expected to affect our dependent variables. 
We control for two political factors: 1) mayors’ vote share and 2) number of political parties sup-
porting the elected mayor in mayoral elections. Mayors’ vote share is a continuous variable, report-
ed in percentage. As many mayoral candidates run without party affiliation, we control for the 
number of political parties that publicly support the elected mayor. It is a continuous variable, rang-
ing from 0 to 6. This data were s obtained from Japanese Research Institute for Local Government 
(2004-2010). 
 
We control for two other factors related to the consolidation: (a) the years elapsed since the munic-
ipal consolidation took place and (b) the number of municipalities involved in each municipal con-
solidation.  We assume that the more years have passed since the municipal consolidation took 
place, the more likely a municipality has been able to cope with the structural change, thus affecting 
its performance.  Moreover, mayors’ performance may improve as municipalities adjust to new 
administrative/organizational structures. If a municipal consolidation took place in 2004, that mu-
                                                     
5
 The Japanese municipal reform began in 1999. Hence, all recent municipal mergers took place after 1999. That is why 
our base-year is 1999 and not 2006--which is the first year covered in our data set.  
6
 Our dataset contains mayor’s education information. However, we dropped the education variable because there is 
little variation in mayor’s education.  
7
 The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications established a study group in 2006 to consider establishing term 
limits. However, very few municipalities have established their own term limit ordinances. 
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nicipality receives a value of “3” in 2006, “4” for 2007, “5” for 2008, “6” for 2009, and “7” for 
2010. If no consolidation has taken place in a particular municipality, for any particular year, the 
municipality-year observation gets a value of “0.” The numbers of municipalities involved in the 
consolidation should also matter for performance. Having more merger partners may generate 
more coordination problems. If municipal consolidation did not take place, we code “1” for the 
municipality. If a municipal consolidation took place in 2004 and involved five municipalities, for 
instance, we give a value of “5” for that municipality in years 2006-2010.8  
 
We also control for the percentage of previous year’s total revenues (out of total municipal reve-
nue) that come from transfers. The expectation is that the more a municipality relies on transfers, 
the fewer incentives a municipality has to increase its own revenue collection through both non-tax 
sources and property tax collection. The specification models for the second and third dependent 
variables also control for the amount of municipal land property, as this is the area available for 
leasing or selling. This measure is in m2.  Municipal population (logged) as a control is included in 
the specification model for the property tax collection. This variable is not included in the other 
models, for their dependent variables are already standardized by population size. As performance 
may change year by year, the three estimated models include year dummies. Table 2 reports the 
correlations matrix for all variables. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Analysis and Results 
 
Our dataset is a panel data of 807 city-level municipalities from 2006 to 2010. Some key variables, 
such as types of municipal consolidations, number of merger partners, mayors’ education, and pub-
lic sector experience, do not vary across for a particular locality. Having time-invariable measures 
impedes us from reporting fixed-effect estimations. Moreover, we are interested in cross-unit, ra-
ther than within-unit, variation. Therefore, we use random-effects estimations with White-Huber 
                                                     
8
 In our sample of 807 municipalities, 42 cities have undergone more than one consolidation through annexation. This 
implies that for the studied period (2006-2010), they still keep their legal status and continue reporting municipal indica-
tors for the core entity, which would be the case if experiencing consolidation through the creation of a new municipality.  
Given the low number of these multi-consolidation cases, our study tests the effect of first consolidation at the city-level. 
However, we did run the analysis after excluding the multi-consolidation cases, and the findings show no significant 
changes in terms of both statistical significance and size of coefficients. We also created a dummy variable, assigning the value 
of “1” to the multi-consolidation units. Again, findings show no considerable changes after including this multi-
consolidation dummy. 
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standard errors clustered at the municipal level.9  We use three models. Model 1 is a base-line mod-
el, which estimates the direct effects of merger type. Model 2 adds mayoral experience and exper-
tise variables. Model 3 includes the interaction terms to text H3. The correlation matrix shows a 
high correlation between years elapsed since the municipal merger and municipal structural context 
(0.82). However, the variance inflation factors (VIF) for the regression models ranges between 1.21 
and 8.66, suggesting that multicollinearity is not an issue in our models. Furthermore, results are 
robust across several specification models.   
 
Explaining municipal operational costs 
 
Models 1, 2, and 3 in Table 3 report the estimations for municipal operational costs. Recall that the 
dependent variable is operational costs per capita in thousand yen. The municipal absorption meas-
ure is negative and statistically significant across the three models. Compared to the non-merged 
units, municipalities that absorbed other municipality (ies) report lower operational costs, ranging 
from - 16.67 to -15.95 thousand yen per capita (approximately -$159 to -$152), holding other varia-
bles fixed. That is, municipal merger through absorption contributes to higher efficiency in admin-
istrative costs, thus supporting H1a.  Mayor’s state or national experience is negative and statistical-
ly significant in model 2 and model 3. That is, municipalities whose mayors come to office with 
public sector experience report lower operational costs (-3.17 to -2.14 thousand yen per capita, 
approximately -$30 to -$20), holding other factors constant. Therefore, H2a receives empirical sup-
port. Mayor’s expertise fails to receive statistical significance.  
 
None of the interaction terms show statistical significance. Therefore, H3 receives no empirical 
support. The three control measures operationalizing municipal contexts are positive and statistical-
ly significant at the 95 level. The more years elapse since the municipal merger, the lager the munic-
ipal operational costs. In addition, and as expected, having more merger partners increases opera-
tional costs. The coefficient on the lag of external revenue sources is positive and statistically signif-
icant. This makes sense because municipalities that rely on external revenue sources tend to have 
less incentives to increase efficiencies in operational costs.  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
9
 In random-effects estimations, the b1 estimation is a matrix-weighted average of between-effects (cross-section) and 
within-panel effects (time-series), under the assumption that b1 really does have the same effect in the cross-section as 
in the time-series. 
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Explaining municipal revenue expansion through non-tax sources 
 
Models 1, 2, and 3 in Table 4 report the estimations for local revenue expansion/per capita through 
non-tax sources. Both types of municipal merger (absorption and creation of new municipality) are 
negative and statistically significant at the 95 and 99 percent level respectively. Therefore, H1b re-
ceives empirical support. Municipalities that absorbed other municipality (ies) tend to collect less 
revenue (-3.06 to -2.89 in thousand yen per capita, approximately -$29 to -$28) through non-tax 
sources compared to those that experienced no merger, holding all else constant. New municipali-
ties also tend to have lower revenue collection through non-tax sources (-3.09 to -2.87 in thousand 
yen per capita, approximately -$29 to -$27), compared to those that experienced no merger. Neither 
mayoral experience nor expertise nor any of the interaction terms report statistical significance.  
Consequently, H2a, H2b, and H3 fail to receive empirical support. 
 
Findings also show that reliance on central transfers does not discourage municipalities from ex-
panding their revenues through non-tax sources. Results also suggest that municipalities with more 
land tend to collect more revenues through non-tax sources, assuming all else is equal.   
 
Explaining municipal effectiveness in property tax collection  
Models 1, 2, and 3 in Table 5 report the estimations for local property tax collection. Recall that the 
dependent variable is the effectiveness in property tax collection. Results show that localities result-
ing from the creation of a new municipality tend to collect less property tax (-0.34 to -0.29%) com-
pared to those municipalities that experience no merger, holding all else constant.  Therefore, H1b 
receives empirical support. Neither mayoral experience nor expertise reports statistical significance 
across three models. Therefore, H2a and H2b fail to receive empirical support. Likewise, none of 
the interaction terms reports statistical significance.  Therefore, H3 fails to receive empirical sup-
port.  
 
Two of the control variables report statistical significance at the 99 level .across three sets of esti-
mations. The coefficient on the service sector workers is negative and statistically significant. That 
is, the more urbanization, the less effectiveness in property-tax collection, holding all else constant.  
Moreover, the larger the population, the higher the effectiveness in property-tax collection.  
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Conclusions 
 
This study explores whether consolidation type affects municipal performance and whether chief 
executives’ experience and expertise moderates the impact of consolidation on performance. Con-
solidation is operationalized through absorption and creation of new municipalities. The study fo-
cuses on all the 807 city-level Japanese municipalities from 2006 to 2010, covering two mayoral 
administrations.  Japan’s experience with consolidation makes their municipalities appropriate set-
tings to test the direct and indirect effect of consolidation on performance.  Moreover, given the 
considerable variation in terms of mayors’ qualifications and expertise, this study also test the effect 
of chief executive’s experience and expertise (e.g., reelection) on municipal performance.  
 
In this study, performance is assessed across two different dimensions: efficacy in operational costs 
and effectiveness in revenue expansion.  By doing so, we test whether the effects of both consoli-
dation and mayoral quality vary across the dimension of performance that is assessed. This study 
also explores whether chief executive’s quality moderates the effects of consolidation on perfor-
mance. Findings reveal that merger through municipal absorption increases efficiency in operation-
al costs but reduces revenue expansion. Merger through creation of a new municipality reduces 
municipal own revenue collection. Chief executive’s past experience neither mitigate nor accelerate 
the effects of municipal consolidation on performance. 
 
The results for property tax collection contrast sharply with those reported in developing munici-
palities (Avellaneda, 2009, Avellaneda and Gomes, 2015). Specifically, in Japan, mayoral quality has 
no impact on property tax collection. Instead, Japan’s culture of compliance, enforcing mecha-
nisms, and/or more favorable economic conditions seem to explain variation in property tax collec-
tion.   
 
Findings also indicate that the type of consolidation matters for municipal performance. However, 
its impact varies depending the dimension of performance that is being explained.   Specifically, 
consolidation through absorption improves efficiency in operational costs but discourages revenue 
expansion through non-tax sources. On the contrary, consolidation through the creation of a new 
municipality discourages, in general, revenue expansion through both property tax collection and 
non-tax resources. This may be explained by fact the creation of a new entity implies new rules, 
norms, culture, procedures, identity all of which disrupt the normal functioning of the administra-
tion. While absorption also implies a shock, this one is less drastic, for there is partial continuation 
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of organizational culture, norms, procedures, rules. Moreover, in municipal absorption, the rela-
tionship between local government and citizens may not be altered considerably.  
 
Political factors play no role in explaining municipal performance in the Japanese local context. 
This contrast with studies in developing and transitional settings where politics does matter for 
performance. Future studies should assess the effect of other political factors, such as electoral 
competitiveness (e.g., margin of victory and number of mayoral candidates), party alignment, and 
divided government, on municipal performance.  Findings also indicate that intergovernmental 
transfers do not discourage municipalities from expanding revenue through non-tax sources.  
 
This study is one of few efforts to explore the combined effect of managerial quality and consolida-
tion in explaining performance in an understudied developed setting, Japanese local governments.  
Our results suggest that organizational structure does influence both revenue expansion and prop-
erty tax collection. Future research should explore whether these findings hold when explaining 
other dimensions of performance (e.g., equity, efficiency, service delivery, etc.).  
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TABLE 1, DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
  Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variables  
    Operational costs/capita (in thousand yen) 4065 275.83 74.52 157.96 1,263.31 
Revenue through non-tax sources /capita 
(in thousand yen) 
4035 16.96 11.16 4.15 370.22 
Tax correction rate (%) 3906 97.43 1.34 88.57 99.60 
 
Independent variables      
Municipal structural context  
(0=No merger, 1=Municipal absorption, 2=New municipali-
ty) 
4021 0.88 0.92 0 2 
Mayoral background ability      Mayor's state or national experience  
(1=Yes, 0=No) 
4016 0.42 0.49 0 1 
Mayor's expertise  
(1=Reelection, 0=No) 
4098 0.45 0.50 0 1 
 
Controls      
Political context      
Vote share (%) 4014 64.89 21.07 25.39 100 
Political party support 4019 1.07 1.33 0 6 
Administrative context      
Years since structural change 4021 2.32 2.56 0 12 
Merging municipalities 4021 2.41 1.96 1 14 
Lag of external revenue source (%) 4024 51.15 15.02 15.93 94.89 
Land property/capita (m2) 4008 208.68 436.25 2.55 3,881.77 
Socioeconomic context      
Population 4035 141,617.90 246,342.80 4425 3627000 
Percentage of workers in the service sector (%) 4022 63.12 9.04 37.40 87.60 
Year dummy  
(0=2006, 1=2007, 2=2008, 3=2009, 4=2010) 
4035 2.00 1.41 0 4 
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TABLE 2, CORRELATION MATRIX  
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 Operational costs/capita 1 
              2 Revenue through non-tax sources 0.59 1 
             3 Tax correction rate -0.20 -0.05 1 
            4 Municipal structural context  0.32 0.05 -0.15 1 
           5 Mayor's state or national experience -0.06 -0.02 0.00 0.10 1 
          6 Mayor's expertise -0.16 -0.04 0.09 -0.40 -0.02 1 
         7 Vote share 0.08 0.09 -0.03 0.03 0.05 0.29 1 
        8 Political party support -0.16 -0.04 0.05 -0.23 0.06 0.28 0.13 1 
       9 Years since structural change 0.29 0.03 -0.08 0.82 0.12 -0.20 0.03 -0.19 1 
      10 Merging municipalities 0.34 0.07 -0.10 0.69 0.12 -0.24 -0.02 -0.13 0.63 1 
     11 Land property/capita 0.49 0.28 -0.18 0.20 -0.02 -0.10 0.01 -0.12 0.16 0.23 1 
    12 Population -0.08 0.02 0.19 -0.13 0.08 0.11 -0.11 0.17 -0.05 -0.04 -0.14 1 
   13 Percentage of workers in the service sector  -0.23 -0.04 0.06 -0.40 0.02 0.19 -0.14 0.24 -0.30 -0.29 -0.13 0.33 1 
  14 Lag of external revenue source 0.67 0.24 -0.44 0.47 -0.01 -0.23 0.09 -0.20 0.38 0.42 0.43 -0.27 -0.32 1 
 15 Year dummy 0.14 -0.04 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.12 0.01 -0.08 0.29 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.03 1 
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TABLE 3, EXPLAINING OPERATIONAL COSTS: 2006-2010 
  
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Independent variable 
   
Municipal structural context (H1a)  
   
Municipal absorption (baseline=No merger) -15.95*** -16.00*** -16.67*** 
 
(3.90) (3.97) (4.80) 
New municipality -2.33 -2.71 -3.60 
 
(5.21) (5.34) (5.84) 
Mayoral background ability 
   Mayor's state or national experience (H2a) 
(1=Yes, 0=No) 
 
-2.14** -3.70** 
  
(0.96) (1.55) 
Mayor's expertise (1=Reelection, 0=No) (H2b)  -0.74 -0.21 
  
(1.05) (1.52) 
Municipal absorption x  
Mayor's state or national experience (H3) 
  
3.12 
   (2.50) 
New municipality x  
Mayor's state or national experience (H3) 
  
2.35 
   
(2.30) 
Municipal absorption x Mayor's expertise (H3) 
  
-1.35 
   
(1.84) 
New municipality x Mayor's expertise (H3) 
  
-0.94 
   
(1.74) 
Controls 
   
Political context 
   
Vote share (%) 0.03 0.03 0.04 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Political party support -0.45 -0.35 -0.33 
 
(0.43) (0.40) (0.40) 
Administrative context 
   
Years since structural change 1.08** 1.17** 1.21** 
 
(0.53) (0.58) (0.58) 
Merging municipalities 6.68*** 6.72*** 6.70*** 
 
(1.39) (1.38) (1.38) 
Lag of external revenue source (%) 1.31*** 1.31*** 1.31*** 
 
(0.12) (0.11) (0.12) 
Socioeconomic context 
   
Percentage of workers in the service sector -0.36 -0.34 -0.34 
 
(0.25) (0.25) (0.25) 
Constant 203.63*** 203.10*** 203.37*** 
 
(17.01) (17.09) (17.02) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,012 4,008 4,008 
Number of municipality 808 808 808 
R-squared overall model 0.389 0.391 0.392 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, Standard errors are clustered by municipalities 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 4, EXPLAINING MUNICIPAL REVENUE EXPANSION THROUGH NON-TAX SOURCES:2006-
2010 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Independent variable 
   
Municipal structural context (H1b)  
   
Municipal absorption (baseline=No merger) -2.89*** -2.95*** -3.06** 
 
(0.90) (0.97) (1.29) 
New municipality -2.96*** -3.09** -2.87** 
 
(1.05) (1.23) (1.42) 
Mayoral background ability 
   Mayor's state or national experience (H2a) 
(1=Yes, 0=No) 
 
-0.00 
(0.31) 
0.10 
(0.50) 
Mayor's expertise (1=Reelection, 0=No) (H2b)  -0.21 -0.39 
  (0.40) (0.62) 
Municipal absorption x  
Mayor's state or national experience (H3) 
  
0.63 
(0.70) 
 
New municipality x  
Mayor's state or national experience (H3) 
  
-0.43 
(0.67) 
    
Municipal absorption x Mayor's expertise (H3) 
  
-0.06 
   
(0.67) 
New municipality x Mayor's expertise (H3) 
  
0.71 
   
(0.61) 
Controls 
   
Political context 
   
Vote share (%) 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Political party support 0.08 0.10 0.11 
 
(0.10) (0.09) (0.09) 
Administrative context 
   
Years since structural change 0.25* 0.27* 0.22 
 
(0.13) (0.16) (0.14) 
Merging municipalities -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 
 
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
Lag of external revenue source (%) 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Land property (ln) 2.09*** 2.08*** 2.09*** 
 
(0.43) (0.43) (0.43) 
Socioeconomic context 
   
Percentage of workers in the service sector 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 
 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Constant -4.25 -4.29 -4.29 
 
(5.02) (5.07) (4.94) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,998 3,994 3,994 
Number of municipality 807 807 807 
R-squared overall model 0.108 0.108 0.109 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, Standard errors are clustered by municipalities 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 5, EXPLAINING EFFECTIVENESS IN PROPERTY TAX COLLECTION: 2006-2010 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Municipal structural context (H1b) 
   
Municipal absorption (baseline=No merger) -0.08 -0.09 0.01 
 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.12) 
New municipality -0.29** -0.31** -0.34** 
 
(0.13) (0.13) (0.14) 
Mayoral background ability 
   Mayor's state or national experience (H2a) 
(1=Yes, 0=No) 
 
-0.00 
(0.04) 
-0.03 
(0.06) 
Mayor's expertise (1=Reelection, 0=No) (H2b)  -0.03 -0.02 
  (0.02) (0.03) 
Municipal absorption x  
Mayor's state or national experience (H3) 
  
-0.07 
(0.10) 
New municipality x  
Mayor's state or national experience (H3) 
  
0.08 
(0.08) 
 
Municipal absorption x Mayor's expertise (H3) 
  
-0.08 
   
(0.05) 
New municipality x Mayor's expertise (H3) 
  
0.01 
   
(0.05) 
Controls 
   
Political context 
   
Vote share (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Political party support 0.01 0.01 0.02 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Administrative context 
   
Years since structural change -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Merging municipalities -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Lag of external revenue source (%) -0.01* -0.01** -0.01* 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Socioeconomic context 
   
Percentage of workers in the service sector -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Population (ln) 0.36*** 0.36*** 0.35*** 
 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Constant 95.44*** 95.45*** 95.48*** 
 
(0.87) (0.87) (0.88) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,897 3,893 3,893 
Number of municipality 785 785 785 
R-squared overall model 0.154 0.155 0.154 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, Standard errors are clustered by municipalities 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
